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Decline in Social Mobility: 
Unfulfilled Aspirations among Egypt’s Educated Youth
* 
 
This paper studies how the gradual suspension of an employment guarantee scheme for 
secondary and post-secondary graduates has affected intergenerational mobility across well-
educated cohorts in Egypt. The empirical results support suggestive evidence in the Middle 
East of a decline in social mobility among the increasingly well-educated youth. The results 
further indicate that unequal opportunities are due to difficulties in attaining high-level 
occupations in the formal private sector for graduates from a lower socio-economic 
background, and that personal connections may play a decisive role. Thus, aside from credit 
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Empirical studies of intergenerational mobility suggest that the transmission of economic
status across generations is higher in less developed countries than in developed ones
(for reviews, see Bj orklund and J antti, 2000; Grawe and Mulligan, 2002; Solon, 2002;
Corak, 2004). That is, with economic development, and particularly with expansion
of the educational system, a country's social mobility will increase. Evidence from the
Middle East, however, suggests that this may not always be the case. Contrary to other
developing regions (e.g. Jensen, 2010; Barro and Lee, 2010), education and labor market
policies in the Middle East have generally been associated with high demand among
the population for higher levels of education. This is said to have led to a tremendous
increase in educational attainment across social strata. Yet, instead of observing an
increase in economic mobility across generations, a widespread narrative in the Middle
East has been that of a decline in social mobility among the increasingly well-educated
youth (e.g. Wickham, 2002; Carvalho, 2010). Quantitative, microeconomic data to test
this claim has not been available.
In the middle of the last century, Arab countries overall started out with low levels
of education. Since then, progress has been rapid despite their comparatively slow
fertility decline (Richards and Waterbury, 2008). At the same time, Middle Eastern
governments felt responsible for providing employment to those with intermediate or
higher education who were unable to nd a job in the private sector, partly out of fear
of political unrest among the urban youth (e.g. Mazumdar, 1989; Salehi-Isfahani, 2007).
In turn, the public sector was, and still is, large in many Middle Eastern countries
(Richards and Waterbury, 2008). This \last resort" option, which had been turned
into formal job guarantee schemes in Morocco and Egypt, quickly became the principal
driver of household investment in education, given the high pay in the public sector
and non-wage benets, such as job stability and social security (Assaad, 1997; Salehi-
Isfahani, 2007). While public sector jobs became less available since the mid-1980s,
the marginalized and highly regulated private sector has been incapable of absorbing
the growing ranks of educated youth, pushing more and more of the educated young
people into unemployment and the informal sector (World Bank, 2004b; Assaad, 2007,
2009).1 Consequently, the reduction in employment opportunities in the formal sector
has created ercer competition among the well educated, raising the question of who
1Compared internationally, youth unemployment is highest in the Middle East and North African
region (World Bank, 2004b; Dhillon, Dyer and Yousef, 2009). Economic underperformance, coupled with
increased levels of schooling, is also viewed as a main driver of the Middle East's Arab Spring (Campante
and Chor, 2011).
2manages to obtain one of the relatively scarce \respectable" jobs.
This paper uses nationally-representative household survey data from Egypt, the
most populous Arab country, whose social, political, and economic developments has
played a central role in the region. Egypt introduced its employment guarantee scheme
for secondary school and university graduates in the early 1960s. However, the scheme
became increasingly untenable in the 1980s, and, since the early 1990s, basically became
defunct (Assaad, 2007). This study makes use of this policy change and analyzes how
the suspension of the employment guarantee scheme and, thereafter, the rapid decline in
formal (public) sector employment, aected social mobility, by comparing intergenera-
tional mobility for graduates born in the 1950s (i.e. 1949-1960, \old cohort") as opposed
to those born in the 1970s (i.e. 1968-1977, \young cohort").
The ndings in this paper generally support suggestive evidence in the Middle East
of a decline in social mobility among the increasingly well-educated youth. Whereas
university graduates born in the 1950s faced equal opportunities on the labor market,
this is not the case for graduates born 20 years later: university graduates from a
high socio-economic background are signicantly more likely to attain a professional
occupation in the formal sector, thus disproportionally leaving the inferior occupations
and jobs to those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. This change over time is also
economically signicant: for the more recent cohort of graduates, having a father working
as professional increases a graduate's probability to attain a professional occupation by
about 20 percentage points as compared to the old cohort of graduates. The empirical
results further suggest that this decline in mobility is linked to how jobs are allocated
in the formal private sector and that personal connections, in particular, may play an
important role.
The nding of a decline in social mobility among the educated is important in several
ways. First, the predominant explanation in the theoretical literature for a high per-
sistence of income or wealth across generations is that of credit market imperfections,
which constrain low-income families from investing in the human capital of their chil-
dren (e.g. Loury, 1981; Becker and Tomes, 1986; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002). Such credit
market imperfections particularly constrain households in developing countries, which
face imperfections in other markets as well (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Udry,
1995) and are vulnerable to risks from a variety of sources, such as illness and drought
(e.g. Morduch, 1995). This reasoning has led some researchers to use intergenerational
educational mobility estimates as a proxy for economic mobility across generations, since
earnings and occupational data regarding parents are often not available from surveys
conducted in developing countries or the data do not allow controlling for potential life
3cycle eects (e.g. Binder and Woodru, 2002; Hertz et al., 2007; Louw, van der Berg
and Yu, 2007; Hertz, Meurs and Selcuk, 2009). Among the few studies that use earnings
or occupational data from developing countries are Valero-Gil and Tijerina-Guajardo
(2002) on Mexico, Grawe (2004) on Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan, and Peru, Dunn (2007)
on Brazil, and Ng (2007) on Malaysia. As the empirical results of this paper illustrate,
while increased access to education may be a necessary condition for increased economic
mobility across generations, it is not a sucient one.
Second, and relatedly, this paper makes a contribution to the rekindled debate about
why educational policies { that is, the expansion of the educational system { have not
been more eective in promoting economic growth in developing countries (Pritchett,
2001; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007). One response among scholars has been to shift
from simply considering years of schooling to more closely examining school quality and
to recognizing the importance of cognitive skills. The ndings of this paper suggest
a potential additional impediment to growth: the functioning of the labor market. In
Egypt { and presumably Middle Eastern countries more generally (compare World Bank,
2004b) { the dominance of the public sector and the high degree of regulation in the
private sector have constrained the labor market's ability to absorb newly-skilled labor
market entrants and to make use of their skills. As the empirical ndings indicate,
it is only when employment opportunities become scarce that a graduate's parental
background begins to play a role, to the extent that, for many, increased educational
achievement has not translated to corresponding economic outcomes.
Finally, this paper provides an important piece of evidence that is missing in the
literature on the Islamic revival. This literature argues that one of the main drivers
for the tremendous rise in Islamic devotion and activism throughout the Middle East
over the past few decades is the combination of increased access to education, which
has raised expectations moving up socially among youth and their families, and reduced
social mobility among the well-educated (e.g. Bayat, 2002; Wickham, 2002; Farah, 2009;
Carvalho, 2010).2 More specically, the reasoning is that the reduction in public sector
employment since the 1980s has disproportionally aected educated youth from a lower
socio-economic background, as getting a formal job in the private sector requires having
the right personal connections and/or additional skills acquired in the private educa-
tion sector, such as a foreign language skill, that these graduates do not have (Salmi,
1990; Wickham, 2002). The fact that unfullled aspirations among these graduates have
2For an extensive review of the literature and a theoretical model of the Islamic revival, see Carvalho
(2010). Carvalho's analysis further suggests that an increase in income inequality and impoverishment
of the lower-middle class has contributed to the Islamic revival in the region.
4stemmed from reduced social mobility has created, in turn, fertile ground for Islamic
groups to recruit followers.3 As argued by Carvalho (2010, p. 2), \religious values not
only de-emphasize material comparisons, they also accentuate moral comparisons." Ad-
herence to Islamic values has enabled graduates from a lower socio-economic background
to compete with those from an elite background (i.e. from the upper or upper middle
class) on a moral playing eld.4
The empirical analysis is restricted to males, given the continued low female labor
force participation in Egypt of under 30% (Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey of 2006,
ELMPS06).5 A graduate's social status can be measured through his father's occupa-
tion; therefore, this study examines whether the association between the occupations of
fathers and sons has increased signicantly across cohorts of the well educated. This
quantitative, microeconomic analysis is made possible through the cross-section of the
2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS06), which provides information not
only about the educational attainment of fathers and sons, but also about their occupa-
tions. Importantly, employment history information for the sons allows one to account
for potential life-cycle eects that may impact intergenerational mobility estimates. In
the case of wage employment, the ELMPS06 also asked respondents questions about
the employment sector and the formality of their job, i.e. whether the job entailed a
work contract and social insurance. Hence, alternative outcome measures can be used
to examine the robustness of the results and to learn about the sources of change in in-
tergenerational mobility. In addition, information about fathers' and sons' educational
attainment is used to study whether the expansion of the educational system indeed
led to an increase in intergenerational educational mobility, enabling children across the
3This grievance-based explanation provides one part of the story { specically, why the Islamic
movement has been driven by the educated. As Wickham (2002) convincingly argues, in an authoritarian
regime, like that of Egypt, the decentralized structure of the Islamic movement, which recruited rst
followers from the \periphery" of the formal political system, has also played a crucial role in mobilizing
many educated, young people.
4The idea may be related to one of the ndings by Campante and Chor (forthcoming), namely, that if
the returns to education are low in the labor market, individuals divert their skills to other (i.e. political)
activities. In the case of Egypt and other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, religious groups
seem to have created an alternative arena where individuals can exercise their skills. Unfortunately, the
dataset at hand does not allow testing of this claim. The 2000 and 2008 World Values Survey (WVS)
data from Egypt, however, provide some weak evidence, namely that university graduates from a lower
socio-economic background attend religious services more frequently than those from the upper (middle)
class.
5Over the past decades, female market labor force participation only slowly increased, from 12%
in 1986 (Richards, 1992, p. 4) to slightly over 20% in the 1990s and nally to 27% in 2006 (Assaad
and El Hamidi, 2009). With jobs in the government sector declining, women { particularly the highly
educated { faced increased diculties obtaining \appropriate" jobs (Assaad and El Hamidi, 2009).
Gender segregation in the labor market remaines high (World Bank, 2004a) and many women stop
working after marriage (e.g. Hoodfar, 1997).
5social strata to achieve secondary and post-secondary degrees.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes how the
Egyptian educational system and the labor market changed since the middle of the 20th
century. Section 3 presents a conceptual framework, while sections 4 and 5 discuss the
methods and the data, respectively. In section 6, the empirical results are presented,
and section 7 concludes.
2 Background
Educational and labor market policies over the past half century must be viewed against
Egypt's high population growth. Egypt's population increased from 22 million in 1950,
to 40 million in 1975 and 77 million in 2005 (UN Population Database). Population
growth alone has placed severe pressures on both the school system and labor market.
In the following, the main trends rst in education and then in the labor market will
be sketched (for details see, amongst others, World Bank, 1991; Richards, 1992; Assaad,
1997; Hargreaves, 1997; UNDP, 1998, 2000; Assaad, 2009).
2.1 The Expansion of the Schooling System
The expansion of the general schooling system began with the 1952 revolution under
Gamal Abdel Nasser (Salmi, 1990). Because of the Suez crises in 1956 and several wars
in the 1960s and 1970s, resources were limited and the government introduced double and
sometimes even triple shifts in primary schools in the early 1960s (Nagi, 2001). Between
1952 and 1965-6, primary education experienced an enrollment growth rate of almost 9%
per annum (Richards, 1992, p. 8).6 Among the population aged 10 and above, illiteracy
rates fell from 85.2% in 1937 to 70.5% in 1960 and 57.2% in 1976 (World Bank, 1991, p.
207). Secondary and post-secondary education expanded even more rapidly. Between
1960 and 1980, enrollment growth rates for secondary education averaged at 15% per
annum (Salmi, 1990, p. 96). In 1963, following the abolishment of fees for primary and
secondary schools, university fees were also abolished. Under Anwar El Sadat (1970-
1981), policies to expand educational access continued. Several new universities were
established in the 1970s (Shann, 1992), and university enrollment increased by over
14% per annum between 1971 and 1977 (World Bank, 1991, p. ii). However, access
to university education became more restrictive in the 1980s and early 1990s in an
eort to limit the supply of university graduates (compare Assaad, 2007). Instead, the
6Between 1988 and 1999, primary education was reduced from 6 to 5 years (Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali
and Assaad, 2009). This policy change does not, however, aect, the cohorts considered in this paper.
6government put a greater emphasis on technical/vocational secondary education (Salmi,
1990).
In Egypt, students bound for university are placed on a separate educational track
when entering secondary school, i.e. around the age of 15 (Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali and
Assaad, 2009). Only students with high scores in the national exam taken at the end
of preparatory school are allowed to enter so-called \general secondary schools." All
other students may enter technical/vocational secondary schools, which include a large
commercial branch and which typically last three years; some last ve. Admission to
university as well as to a particular course of study depends on the results of an exam-
ination taken at the end of the general secondary school, called the thanaawiya aama
(Hargreaves, 1997). Only the best students are allowed to study medicine or engineering;
those with lower grades may \only" become teachers. There is evidence that students
(and their families) prefer university over vocational education even though earnings
are not necessarily higher (Salmi, 1990). One explanation is the low status attached
to such technical schools; typically students who attend them previously failed to enter
the university track (Salmi, 1990; Richards, 1992). More generally, education is highly
valued in society and in the marriage market in particular, so that potential earnings
are not the only concern (e.g., Salmi, 1990; Hoodfar, 1997). Another explanation is that
a university diploma is important for obtaining a professional, formal job. Thus, even
while the chances of obtaining such a job have declined, families may prefer not to forego
the opportunity altogether (Salmi, 1990; Hargreaves, 1997).
There is ample evidence that private costs to education, in particular for private
lessons, have been increasing over the last two to three decades (Richards, 1992; Har-
greaves, 1997; UNDP, 1998, 2000). Policies in the 1980s that introduced exams and
reduced the ability to students to repeat grades at the end of primary and preparatory
school education have been one reason for this increase (e.g. Hanushek and Lavy, 1994).
Furthermore, as real wages have been deteriorating since the mid-1980s, private tutor-
ing { albeit still illegal { has become an extra source of income for teachers (UNDP,
1998). These developments might also explain why a relatively high percentage of men
in the young cohort have failed to obtain any formal educational degree. It could also
be an additional driver of limited mobility at the top of the educational distribution,
as low-income families are likely to lack the nancial resources for extensive private
tutoring.
72.2 The Employment Guarantee Scheme and its Legacies
Socialist policies led to the nationalization of Egypt's industries in the 1960s (World
Bank, 1991). In 1961, the government introduced an employment guarantee scheme for
university graduates, and in 1964, extended it to include secondary school graduates
(Assaad, 1997; Handoussa and El Oraby, 2004). The employment guarantee scheme is
a reection of the patron-client relationship, or \social contract", between the Egyptian
state and its citizens (e.g. Bayat, 2002; Richards and Waterbury, 2008). The state
perceives itself as the provider of jobs and welfare benets (including a wide range of
subsidies). In return for these services, Egyptian leaders expected political support.
Since jobs in the government sector have traditionally meant high job stability, social
insurance, access to subsidized goods and accommodations as well as other benets
(Assaad, 1997), the demand for higher education increased sharply with the introduction
of this employment scheme, as did the number of applicants for government sector jobs.
Due to the high economic growth rates following the oil boom, revenues from the
Suez Canal and high remittance ows, the employment guarantee scheme survived the
1970s. On average, the Egyptian economy grew at a rate of 9% per annum between
1974 and 1981 (World Bank, 1991, p. 43). Labor supply pressures were partly reduced
because of Sadat's open door policy, under which, by some estimates, about 10% of the
labor force was abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Iraq (for a discussion see Sell, 1988; Kandil and Metwally, 1992). Neverthe-
less, over time, the employment guarantee scheme became more and more untenable
(for details see Assaad, 1997; Handoussa and El Oraby, 2004). From 1978 onward, the
government allowed public enterprises to circumvent the employment guarantee scheme.
Public sector employees were also oered to take unpaid leave in order to work in the
private sector. Nevertheless, by 1982-3 government employment was triple the level wit-
nessed in 1966 (Richards, 1992, p. 33, based on Handoussa 1988). When Hosni Mubarak
(1981-2011) came into power, the employment guarantee scheme was not immediately
abolished. A number of changes to the scheme were made, however, including increased
waiting periods for jobs in the government sector, particularly for secondary school grad-
uates. By the end of the 1980s, the waiting period was more than ve years. Moreover,
wages in the public sector deteriorated in real terms. Despite these changes, in the 1990s
still many lined up for government sector jobs due to the extra benets they provided.
Given the short working hours in government agencies, many workers made up for low
wages by moonlighting after work. The mass private-sector resignations that occurred
when the government decided in 1992 to take graduates with a private sector job o
8the government-job registry is one clear example of the public's strong preference for
public sector work. Wickham (2002, p. 57) also notes that among the graduates she
interviewed, manual occupations were seen as a last (and temporary) resort only.
In 1991, Egypt adopted the Economic Reform Structural Adjustment Program, a
program supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Korayem,
1997). While labor market policies were introduced in the 1990s to make the economy
more competitive, it was only in 2003 that rigid labor market regulations on hiring and
ring were truly relaxed (Salehi-Isfahani, Tunali and Assaad, 2009). With a declining
government sector and a constrained private sector, unemployment rates were highest
for men with a technical secondary-school degree in both 1988 and 1998, particularly in
rural areas (Assaad, 2009). Furthermore, an increasing percentage of well-educated labor
market entrants have been forced to take up jobs in the informal sector or work unpaid for
the family (Amer, 2009; Assaad, 2009; Assaad, Binzel and Gadallah, 2010). These labor
market developments have also been aggravated by reduced employment opportunities
in the Gulf that used to cushion labor supply pressures in Egypt, especially in the 1970s
and early 1980s (Kandil and Metwally, 1992; Aly and Shields, 1996; Wickham, 2002).
By comparing men born in 1949-1960 (old cohort) and men born in 1968-1977 (young
cohort), one can evaluate the overall eect of these changes in the educational system
and the labor market on intergenerational mobility. Those born between 1949 and
1960 were the rst to benet from the expansion of the educational system with free
schooling across all educational levels.7 Men of the older cohort were also eligible for
the employment guarantee scheme, provided that they had succeeded in achieving a
secondary or post-secondary degree. On the other hand, men born between 1968 and
1977 were confronted with very dierent labor market conditions when they entered the
labor market in the 1990s { in particular, the employment guarantee scheme was only
partially in eect. Despite declining opportunities in the government sector, the private
sector remained highly regulated.
3 Conceptual Framework
The narrative of this paper is that Egypt's employment guarantee scheme created as-
pirations among families from a low socio-economic background for moving up socially
by investing in the education of their children, but that these aspirations have, to some
extent, remained unfullled, due to the gradual suspension of the scheme in the 1980s,
7Note that at age 15 it is already decided whether a child will enter a university or a techni-
cal/vocational track.
9which has led to a decline in social mobility.8
To formalize this idea, suppose that there are only two schooling levels, S = f0;1g.
For illustration, assume that S = 0 refers to less than a university education, while
S = 1 refers to a university education. Also, there are only two occupational outcomes,
high (say, professional; h) and low (say, other non-manual and manual occupations; l).
Parents decide whether or not to invest in their child's schooling. Without schooling
(S = 0), their child obtains a low-level occupation. With schooling (S = 1), their
child obtains a high-level occupation with probability P, or a low-level occupation, with
probability 1   P. Conditional on S = 1, it is assumed that this probability depends
solely on the child's socio-economic background, or status.
Suppose that there are two time periods, t = f1;2g. In the rst time period, parents
decide whether or not to invest in their child's schooling, while in the second, their child
reaps any benets of the schooling investment. Then, in t = 1, parents choose to invest
in their child's schooling if
Pt=1 Yh + (1   Pt=1)Yl   C  Yl; (1)
where C refers to schooling costs and Yh (Yl) to the benets associated with a high-level
(low-level) occupation. Note that such benets might include not only earnings, but also
less tangible job perquisites, such as having a formal job and social status.9 That is,
parents choose to provide their child with a university education if the net expected payo
is greater than the payo for a low-level occupation, which their child would otherwise
attain. Recall that having invested in schooling does not necessarily assure securing
a high-level occupation: securing a high-level occupation depends on the probability
P. An implicit assumption being made is that parents have full information about the
occupational outcomes of educated youth who enter the labor market in the same time
period in which they make the schooling decision for their child, i.e. in t = 1, as well as
the socio-economic background of the young graduates. Because parents cannot look into
the future, they use this information to determine the probability Pt=1, which constitutes
their best prediction for the actual, ex-post probability that their child will face when
leaving school in period t = 2 (Pt=2). Note that if the probability of securing a high-level
occupation is the same for children from dierent socio-economic backgrounds, a child's
8The framework presented in this section has similarities to the Roy model as described in Heckman,
Lochner and Todd (2006).
9While private costs for (public) schooling have increased in Egypt, lower income households have
tried to aord the schooling costs of at least one of their sons to ensure a stable (even if not particularly
high) income stream as well as to gain access to goods and services that used to accompany a government
sector job (see also section 2).
10labor-market outcome is independent of his socio-economic background, implying equal
opportunities in the labor market.10
Note that, for simplicity, schooling costs (C), the value of a high-level occupation
(Yh), and the value of a low-level occupation (Yl) are assumed to be xed over time.






1 if Pt=1 (Yh   Yl)  C
0 otherwise
(2)
Since in the worst case scenario, i.e. with probability 1   Pt=1, an educated child (with
S = 1) will attain a low-level occupation, the additional benet from having a high-
level occupation times the probability of achieving it needs to exceed schooling costs for
parents to invest in their child's schooling.
In period t = 2, the child realizes his payo,
U = S [Pt=2 Yh + (1   Pt=2) Yl] + (1   S) Yl (3)
If parents choose not to invest in their child's schooling in period t = 1, U = Yl,
i.e. the child receives the benet of a low-level occupation in the following period. In
contrast, if parents invest in their child's schooling, so that S = 1, the child faces a new
probability of securing a high-level occupation in t = 2, Pt=2. Given that Yh and Yl are
assumed to be time-invariant, dierences in a child's ex-ante and ex-post payos { or,
returns to education { depend solely on Pt=1 and Pt=2, respectively.11
As stated earlier, it is assumed for simplicity that, conditional on having invested
in education, P depends solely on a child's socio-economic background. Suppose that
the society we are concerned with consists of only two distinct socio-economic classes,
labeled high and low. Then, social mobility declines if
Phigh;t=2   Plow;t=2 > Phigh;t=1   Plow;t=1; or (4)
Phigh;t=2   Phigh;t=1 > Plow;t=2   Plow;t=1: (5)
That is, the probability of achieving a high-level occupation decreases more strongly
(or, increases less) over time for educated children from a low socio-economic background
10An implicit assumption is that besides the formal educational degree, personality traits and other
individual characteristics are randomly assigned, i.e. are not correlated with social class. Similar as-
sumptions have been made in the related theoretical literature (e.g. Loury, 1981).
11For the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post returns to education see Heckman, Lochner and
Todd (2006).
11relative to educated children from a high socio-economic background. Or, alternatively,
graduates from a high socio-economic background become more likely over time to at-
tain a high-level occupation compared to their counterparts from a low socio-economic
background.
With regard to Egypt, changes in these probabilities have been triggered by a com-
bination of reduced employment opportunities { reducing both Phigh and Plow { and
advantages enjoyed by graduates from a higher socio-economic background, namely: (1)
personal connections, called wasta (Wickham, 2002, p. 55); and (2) nancial resources
that enable them to acquire additional skills oered by the private education sector.
These advantages can be interpreted as changing the relationship between Phigh and
Plow over time. Testing whether this relative change in probabilities is statistically and
economically signicant is the aim of the empirical analysis. Note that the dataset does
not allow one to discriminate between dierent sources of the decline in social mobility
across cohorts, even though some evidence will be provided that personal connections
do appear to play a role. P thus captures factors outside the formal educational degree
a child has acquired.
Comparing the cohorts 1949-1960 and 1968-1977 thus has two purposes: rst, when
parents of the young cohort (1968-1977) made the schooling decision for their children,
they based their expectations about the ex-post returns to education for their children
{ more specically, the probability of attaining a high-level occupation, Pt=2 { on the
labor market experiences of the old cohort (1949-1960). In particular, the old cohort
beneted from the employment guarantee scheme. Since there was no sign at that time
that the scheme would soon be abolished, many low-income parents of the young cohort
decided to invest in their child's education. Hence, by comparing the probabilities for
these two cohorts, one can infer whether, for graduates of the young cohort, the ex-post
returns to education are below their ex-ante returns to education due to a decline in
social mobility, and thus, whether aspirations among those from a low socio-economic
background remain unfullled. (Recall that in the framework presented here, changes
in the returns to education depend solely on changes in P; Yh and Yl are assumed to be
time-invariant.) Second, as argued in section 2, it allows one to evaluate how the decline
in government sector employment has aected social mobility.
4 Empirical Approach
The main part of the empirical analysis aims at testing whether, conditional on having
achieved a certain educational degree, the probability of attaining a high-level occupa-
12tion has changed across the social strata over time, i.e. whether inequality (4) holds.
By measuring an individual's socio-economic background through his father's occupa-
tional attainment, the empirical analysis can essentially be viewed as examining how
intergenerational occupational mobility has changed across well-educated cohorts. That
is, the sample is restricted to men of the old cohort (born 1949-1960) and the young
cohort (born 1968-1977) who achieved at least a university or a comparable degree (i.e.
a post-secondary degree). The empirical model is summarized by the following equation:
P(Prof = 1) = 0 + 1Proffa + 2Y ng + 3(Proffa  Y ng)+
4Urban + Y rBirth  +  (6)
where P(Prof = 1) refers to the son's probability of attaining a professional occupation
or, more generally, a non-manual occupation, which includes white collar occupations.
Alternatively, for wage workers, information about the characteristics of the job, namely
the formality of the job and the sector of employment (public versus private) is used. For
the old cohort, non-manual, formal jobs essentially meant having a government sector
job, given that the private sector at that time was almost non-existent. For the young
cohort, we would expect to observe instead { and we do { a higher share of men with
formal jobs in the private sector. Further, if the higher-paid formal jobs are indeed
increasingly located in the private sector and require personal connections or additional
skills, such as the knowledge of foreign languages, we should not observe a decline in
mobility if the outcome of interest is employment in the government sector.
Life-cycle eects are controlled for by comparing the occupational outcomes of sons at
a specic age. For reasons explained in the following section, the son's occupation at age
28 is used.12 In the simplest specication, Proffa is a binary variable indicating whether
the father worked as a professional. Hence, in terms of the conceptual framework, 1
gives an estimate of Phigh  Plow in t = 1. Alternatively, ve occupational categories are
distinguished, namely professional, white-collar, skilled manual workers, semi/unskilled
manual workers and farmers (see also next section). Y ng is a dummy for belonging to
the young cohort (i.e. sons born in 1968-1977), Y rBirth stands for the son's year of
birth dummies, and Urban is a binary variable indicating urban residence at birth.
To assess changes in Phigh   Plow across cohorts (over time), an interaction term
between Proffa and Y ng is included. Under the employment guarantee scheme, parental
background should not have played any role, i.e. 1 is expected to be statistically
12As explained in the following section, the data do not allow one to control for potential life-cycle
eects with regard to fathers, which should not, however, constitute a serious drawback.
13insignicant, while for graduates of the young cohort, having a father working as a
professional is expected to increase the son's likelihood of also working as a professional.
That is, the main hypothesis is that 3 is positive and statistically signicant.
The sociological literature has largely paid attention to university graduates. Since
the employment guarantee scheme also applied to secondary school graduates, the sam-
ple is alternatively restricted to men with secondary school degrees and higher, in order
to examine the sensitivity of the results. Note that conditioning on the son's educational
attainment eliminates the complication that correlations between father and son occu-
pations may be based on the son's human capital investment, at least in terms of the
formal degree achieved.
An alternative way to study the creation of unfullled aspirations is to examine
whether the (occupational) return to a university degree has declined over time for
men from a low, relative to a high, socio-economic background. This corresponds to
estimating the following equation, using a similar set of covariates as before, but drawing
on the full sample:
P(Prof = 1) = 0 + Edu  + 1Y ng + (Edu  Y ng)+
2Proffa + (Edu  Proffa) + (Edu  Proffa  Y ng)+
3Urban + Y rBirth  + ; (7)
where Edu stands for dummies for the highest educational degree attained (primary
or preparatory degree, secondary degree, and post-secondary degree; the reference cat-
egory being \no degree"). The coecient estimates on the rst interaction terms, ,
will reveal whether the occupational return to university education (relative to having
no educational degree) decreased over time for men whose father is not working as a
professional. In contrast, the coecient estimates on the last interaction terms, , allow
one to directly test whether the occupational return to a university degree has increased
for graduates from a high, relative to a low, socio-economic background.
5 Data
The empirical analysis draws on the 2006 cross-section of the Egypt Labor Market Panel
Survey (ELMPS06). 8,349 households (consisting 37,140 individuals) were captured in
this nationally representative survey in 2005-06. Of this number, 3,684 households had
been previously interviewed in the 1998 survey wave and 2,167 households represented
splits from these. The remaining 2,498 households were new (refresher sample). Unless
14Table 1: Summary Statistics for Men Born 1949-60 (\Old Cohort") and 1968-1977
(\Young Cohort").
Old cohort Young cohort
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Years of schooling 1,858 6.62 6.48 2,633 9.78 5.72
No degree 1,858 0.44 0.50 2,633 0.20 0.40
Primary/preparatory degree 1,858 0.17 0.37 2,633 0.17 0.37
Secondary degree 1,858 0.19 0.39 2,633 0.35 0.48
Post-secondary degree 1,858 0.20 0.40 2,633 0.28 0.45
Father: years of schooling 1,860 1.67 4.05 2,648 2.70 5.07
Father: No degree 1,860 0.84 0.37 2,648 0.75 0.43
Father: Primary/preparatory degree 1,860 0.09 0.28 2,648 0.11 0.32
Father: Secondary degree 1,860 0.04 0.20 2,648 0.07 0.26
Father: Post-secondary degree 1,860 0.04 0.19 2,648 0.07 0.25
Farmers 1,624 0.26 0.44 2,320 0.17 0.38
Semi/Unskilled manual 1,624 0.13 0.34 2,320 0.16 0.36
Skilled manual 1,624 0.17 0.38 2,320 0.24 0.42
White collar 1,624 0.17 0.37 2,320 0.16 0.37
Professional 1,624 0.27 0.44 2,320 0.28 0.45
Wage workers: formal job 1,166 0.60 0.49 1,748 0.45 0.50
Wage workers: government sector job 1,166 0.57 0.50 1,748 0.34 0.47
Father: farmers 1,850 0.47 0.50 2,571 0.35 0.48
Father: semi/unskilled manual 1,850 0.12 0.32 2,571 0.15 0.36
Father: skilled manual 1,850 0.11 0.31 2,571 0.13 0.34
Father: white collar 1,850 0.12 0.32 2,571 0.16 0.37
Father: professional 1,850 0.19 0.39 2,571 0.21 0.41
Urban residence 1,860 0.47 0.50 2,650 0.46 0.50
Urban residence at birth 1,860 0.44 0.50 2,650 0.45 0.50
Notes: \Years of schooling" is based on the highest educational degree obtained.
Employment-related information refers to the occupation at age 28. A \formal" job is dened
as a job with a wage contract and social insurance. Based on the ELMPS06 (weighted).
otherwise stated, descriptive statistics are based on the weighted data.13
Summary statistics for both cohorts are presented in Table 1. The old cohort, i.e.
men born in 1949-1960, comprises 1,860 individuals, while the young cohort, i.e. men
born in 1968-1977, comprises 2,650 individuals. This strong increase in the sample size
reects the overall high population growth in Egypt. When the father is absent from
the household, the interviewee was asked about his father's education, i.e. the highest
degree obtained, as well as the father's occupation when the interviewee was 15. For
sons living together with their fathers, this information is derived from the household
13Since data collection took place in December 2005 and early 2006, information such as an individual's
age generally refers to the year 2005.
15Notes: 3-year moving averages. Source: ELMPS06.
Figure 1: Changes in Educational Attainment of Men over Time, by Year of Birth.
questionnaire.
For both fathers and their sons, educational degrees are grouped into the following
major categories: no (formal) degree, lower-secondary degree (i.e. primary and prepara-
tory degree), secondary school degree and post-secondary degree, a category which also
includes 5-year technical secondary-school graduates. Alternatively, education is mea-
sured in terms of years of schooling based on the nal degree obtained, i.e. 0 years for
no formal education, 6 years for primary education, 9 years for preparatory education,
12 years for secondary education, 14 years for ve-year technical secondary education,
16 years for university education and 19 for graduate education.
Figure 1 clearly shows the strong decline over the past decades in the share of men
with no formal educational degree. At the same time, both the share of men with a
secondary school degree or above has increased. The share of men with a primary or
preparatory degree is comparatively small and has remained roughly unchanged. Figure
1 also illustrates the eect of the policy shift from university to technical secondary
16education in the 1980s that was described in section 2.
The ELMPS06 contains information about an individual's rst job, current job and
{ as part of the employment history section { up to two previous jobs. Employment-
related information includes, among others, an individual's occupation, his waged status
and, for wage workers, whether he has a work contract and/or social insurance as well as
his sector of employment.14 A job is dened as formal if it provides both a work contract
and social insurance. Intensive data cleaning and consistency checks of the employment
history section revealed that merely 4.13% of men aged 20-65 (N=8,977) had had more
than three jobs at the time of the survey.15 For 2.48% of men in this age group, the
employment history section contains inconsistencies or errors, or it lacks information
about the year an individual started an activity and/or about his employment status.
In total, valid information is available for 93.39% of men aged 20 to 65.
Similar to categories used elsewhere by economists (e.g., Schmidt and Strauss, 1975;
Long and Ferrie, 2007), the following ve occupational categories were constructed:
professionals (i.e. lower and higher service workers), (other) white-collar workers (i.e.
routine non-manual), skilled manual laborers, semi/unskilled manual laborers and farm-
ers. For details about the construction of the occupational categories and their relation
to various job characteristics, including earnings, see Appendix A. These descriptive
statistics show, among other things, that professional and { to a lesser extent { white
collar occupations are highly correlated with job formality and (for older cohorts) work-
ing in the government sector. In view of the decline in real wages, formal jobs in the
government sector may not necessarily be associated with earning a high wage. Never-
theless, formal, non-manual jobs even if located in the public sector have been preferred
as primary jobs over manual, mostly informal jobs as they provide households with a
stable stream of income and access to a wide range of goods and services (Assaad, 1997).
Also note that as a result of the decline in government sector jobs the composition of
the workforce has changed over the considered time period. Among men with secondary
and post-secondary degrees, for example, the share of men in wage employment at the
age of 28 has declined from 92% for men of the old cohort (born in 1949-1960) to 78%
for men of the young cohort (born in 1968-1977).
To deal with the potential life-cycle bias in intergenerational mobility estimates (see
e.g., Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1983; Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007), sons'
14Note that the terms government sector and public sector are used interchangeably.
15For a small number of men, whose earliest job in the employment history section started at most
one year after they took up their rst job, it is assumed that they did not experience any job change
between their rst job and the earliest job in the employment history section. These men are therefore
included in the analysis.
17Table 2: Job versus Occupational Changes for Men Aged 20-65.
Age at obtaining rst, etc. job Age at obtaining rst, etc. occupation
Mean Std. Dev. N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. N Min Max
1st 17.57 5:36 8,373 6 41 1st 17.57 5:36 8,373 6 41
2nd 23.98 9:08 5,850 6 63 2nd 27.59 8:16 2,526 7 61
3rd 29.69 9:80 1,908 10 63 3rd 34.62 10:74 301 16 61
4th 33.62 10:34 261 14 60 4th 33.50 8:07 6 25 48
Notes: The descriptive statistics are restricted to men aged 20-65 with a valid job path (ELMPS06).
occupational characteristics are compared at a particular age. The selection of a reference
age has trade-os. While most men should have reached their permanent occupational
status, i.e. \occupational maturity" (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1983), by the
reference age, we would also like to avoid dropping young individuals from the sample.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics concerning the age at which men started their
rst, second, etc. job and occupation. Hence, the right-hand side of the table takes only
job changes into consideration that implied an occupational change as well. In general,
men in Egypt start working at an early age. This is particularly true of men in the old
cohort, in which 38% of males started working by the age 15. Furthermore, relatively few
changed jobs several times and if they did, it was usually at the beginning of their careers.
If we consider only job changes that result in an occupational change, a high share of
men had a maximum of two changes. On average, men were 28 when they experienced
this second occupational change. For this reason, the age of 28 is chosen as reference
age. At this age, 99% of men aged 20-65 (with a valid job path) had obtained their
rst job. The main assumption being made is that men's transition to their permanent
occupational status has not changed across the two cohorts, or rather that this transition
is on average completed by the time they turn 28. Given that by the age of 28, even
university graduates have been exposed to the labor market for several years, changes
in the transition from school to work should have little eect. Nonetheless, as part of
the sensitivity analysis, sons' occupations are compared at age 30 (see section 6.3).
Out of all men aged 28 to 65, there was consistent data in 92% of cases. As part of the
robustness analysis, men's current and rst job in the event of missing data is used (see
section 6.3). 12% of the male sample (aged 28-65) had experienced one unemployment
phase by the time of the survey and less than 1% had experienced two phases.16 Most
of these men were unemployed early in life after leaving school and before obtaining
16Similarly, \jobless" periods including temporarily disability and the residual category \other" have
essentially occurred prior to age 28.
18their rst job. This reects the fact that in Egypt unemployment is essentially a school-
to-work-transition problem (World Bank, 2004b; Assaad, 2009). Also, there are no (or
little) social welfare benets that can be claimed. Less than 10% of those who had
experienced unemployment had been aected at age 28 or later and only a couple of
individuals at age 28. Consequently, not working does not constitute a category of its
own. Instead, the occupation prior to the unemployment period is used for those who
were unemployed at age 28.
Out of all sons with valid employment history information, the father's occupational
status when the son was aged 15 and father's years of schooling were available in 98%
of cases. Missing information was most often related to the fathers' occupation, i.e. to
fathers who were living in the household at the time of the survey and who had missing
entries in the employment history section. Less than 1% of fathers were recalled by
interviewees as not working when the interviewee was 15. These fathers and sons were
dropped from the empirical analysis. As there is no information about fathers' year of
birth for those not living together with their son, it is not possible to control for life-cycle
eects for fathers. However, as fathers are typically well in their 30s or older when the
son was aged 15, life-cycle eects should matter little.
From the migration history section, one can infer an individual's place of residence
at birth, i.e. whether he was born in a rural or in an urban area. Residence at birth
instead of sons' current residence is used due to the fact that migration is likely to be
endogenous. Using instead the sons' place of residence at the time of the survey aects
mainly the old cohort, as rural-urban migration was stronger then (see section 6.3).
6 Results
Before examining whether there has been a decline in intergenerational economic mo-
bility across cohorts of graduates, this section provides evidence for a strong increase
in intergenerational educational mobility, including increased secondary schooling and
above for those from a low socio-economic background. Thus, the rst subsection pro-
vides suggestive evidence that the expansion of the educational system, together with
the employment guarantee scheme, created aspirations among low-income families to
move up socially.
19Table 3: Overall Change in Intergenerational Educational Mobility.
1949-1960 Cohort 1968-1977 Cohort
Upwardly mobile 0.50 0.68
Downwardly mobile 0.02 0.02
Immobile 0.48 0.30
Notes: Calculations are based on weighted mobility tables, see
Table 14 in the Appendix.
Table 4: Outow Percentages for Fathers' and Sons' Educational Attainment.
1949-1960 Cohort (N=1,858)
Son's education
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
(1) No degree 51:24 18:32 18:12 12:32 100.00
Father's (2) Primary/preparatory degree 12:74 13:57 26:58 47:11 100.00
education (3) Secondary degree 4:72 6:58 29:14 59:56 100.00
(4) Post-secondary degree 0:00 1:54 12:22 86:24 100.00
Total 44:07 16:79 19:09 20:05 100.00
1968-1977 Cohort (N=2,631)
Son's education
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
(1) No degree 25:87 19:54 36:11 18:48 100.00
Father's (2) Primary/preparatory degree 6:07 13:55 41:13 39:26 100.00
education (3) Secondary degree 0:93 4:68 38:59 55:80 100.00
(4) Post-secondary degree 0:47 1:52 10:03 87:97 100.00
Total 20:20 16:62 35:09 28:10 100.00
Source: ELMPS06.
6.1 Intergenerational Educational Mobility across Cohorts
Table 3 displays overall shares of downward, upward and immobile sons belonging to the
old and the young cohort.17 These statistics suggest that intergenerational educational
mobility has indeed increased markedly from the old to the young cohort: the share
of upwardly mobile men went up from 50% to 68%. This increase is entirely due to a
17These shares are calculated based on the mobility table of each cohort, see Table 14 in the Appendix.
Below the diagonal in the mobility table are sons who earned a higher degree than their fathers, i.e. are
upwardly mobile, while sons above the diagonal are less educated than their fathers, i.e. are downwardly
mobile.
20decrease in the share of immobile men.
To get a better idea of which father-son pairs drive overall upward mobility, Table
4 shows the outow percentages for the father-son pairs of both cohorts. Outow per-
centages provide information about the distribution of the son's educational attainment
while keeping father's education xed. They indicate that upward movements not only
occurred into the next category but also that the sons of fathers with no educational
attainment achieved secondary education or above: among the young cohort, 36% of
men whose father had no formal degree achieved a secondary school degree and 18%
achieved a post-secondary degree. The outow percentages also suggest a strong decline
in immobility at the bottom of the educational distribution. In the old cohort, 51%
of men whose fathers did not earn any formal degree also ended up having no formal
degree, whereas this share decreased to 26% for the young cohort. Overall, therefore,
there has been an impressive increase in educational mobility between generations.
Analog to equation (6), the upper part of Table 5 presents ordinary least squares
(OLS) results for regressing a son's years of education on his father's years of education,
a dummy for belonging to the young cohort, an interaction term between these two
terms and year of birth dummies.18 For men of the old cohort, one additional year of
schooling for the father is associated with an increase in 0.7 years of schooling for the
son. This association decreases signicantly by 0.3 years for men of the young cohort. In
light of the fact that schooling used to be less available in rural areas than in urban ones,
one would expect a stronger association between father's and son's years of schooling
in rural areas. This is indeed the case, as shown in the fourth and fth columns. The
results, however, also suggest that rural areas have been catching up with urban areas
in providing more equal educational opportunities.
In an alternative specication, father's schooling is measured as a categorical vari-
able (no educational degree, primary/preparatory degree, secondary degree, and post-
secondary degree). This allows one to examine whether the relationship between fathers'
and sons' education is non-linear and to grasp what is driving changes in the mean asso-
ciation between fathers' and sons' education. Results for this alternative specication are
presented in the lower part of Table 5. There is a particularly strong negative association
between fathers without any formal degree and sons' years of schooling: in comparison
18For clarity of exposition only the coecients of the main variables of interest are reported. Alterna-
tively, son's education is regressed on parents' education, i.e. the average of the father's and mother's
education. Coecient estimates are very similar but slightly larger than those estimated by Hertz et al.
(2007) based on survey data collected by IFPRI in 1997. Note that there is little variation in mother's
education as few mothers earned a formal degree; 95% of mothers from the old cohort and 87% of
mothers from the young cohort have no formal degree.
21Table 5: Relationship between Father's Education and Son's Years of Schooling.
Dependent variable: son's years of schooling
Old cohort Young cohort Full sample Rural Urban
Fa: years of schooling 0:698*** 0:440*** 0:698*** 0:871*** 0:530***
(0:027) (0:015) (0:027) (0:073) (0:030)
Fa: years of schooling  0:258***  0:393***  0:172***
 young cohort (d) (0:031) (0:079) (0:035)
N 1,878 2,671 4,549 2,106 2,443
R
2 0.2109 0.1576 0.2337 0.2018 0.2294
Alternative specication:
Fa: no degree  7:879***  5:224***  7:879***  10:220***  5:841***
(0:493) (0:268) (0:492) (1:025) (0:554)
Fa: primary/preparatory degree  1:684**  1:836***  1:684**  3:335**  1:252
(0:690) (0:342) (0:689) (1:368) (0:766)
Fa: post-secondary degree 2:249*** 1:591*** 2:249*** 0:708 2:439***
(0:566) (0:276) (0:566) (1:707) (0:595)
Fa: no degree 2:654*** 4:253*** 1:829***
 young cohort (d) (0:560) (1:177) (0:632)
Fa: primary/preparatory degree  0:152 0:780  0:212
 young cohort (d) (0:770) (1:568) (0:847)
Fa: post-secondary degree  0:659 0:271  0:618
 young cohort (d) (0:630) (1:836) (0:663)
N 1,878 2,671 4,549 2,106 2,443
R
2 0.2162 0.1560 0.2353 0.2007 0.2318
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: OLS results are reported with standard errors controlling for clustering at the household level in
parentheses. All specications include dummies for the son's year of birth and a constant. \Old" cohort
refers to men born 1949-1960 while \young" cohort refers to men born 1968-1977. \Urban areas" and
\rural areas" refer to the place of residence at birth. The reference category for father's education in
the alternative specication is \secondary degree".
to fathers with a secondary school education, sons of fathers without a formal degree
have nearly 8 less years of schooling. Particularly in rural areas, sons of fathers with no
formal degree or { although to a lesser extent { with a primary or preparatory degree
were disadvantaged. Yet there was also no extra benet in rural areas from having a
father with a post-secondary degree as compared to a secondary school degree. In urban
areas, by contrast, the sons of fathers with a university degree do experience a benet,
which has not declined signicantly over time. This may be a rst sign of lower mobility
at the top of the educational distribution.
Table 6 reports the OLS results from estimating the son's likelihood of obtaining
a secondary school degree or higher (i) and a post-secondary degree (ii).19 As before,
19Probit estimates were similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, except for the specication
22Table 6: Relationship between Father's Education and the Son Obtaining a
Secondary Degree (and above).
Dependent variable: son with
(i) a secondary degree or above (ii) a post-secondary degree
Full sample Rural Urban Full sample Rural Urban
Fa: years of schooling 0:049*** 0:059*** 0:038*** 0:045*** 0:045*** 0:041***
(0:002) (0:005) (0:002) (0:003) (0:007) (0:003)
Fa: years of schooling  0:018***  0:026***  0:012***  0:007**  0:007  0:006*
 young cohort (d) (0:002) (0:006) (0:003) (0:003) (0:008) (0:004)
N 4,549 2,106 2,443 4,549 2,106 2,443
R
2 0.1875 0.1676 0.1800 0.2026 0.1373 0.2104
Alternative specication:
Fa: no degree  0:628***  0:765***  0:503***  0:594***  0:520***  0:560***
(0:026) (0:038) (0:032) (0:041) (0:125) (0:043)
Fa: primary/preparatory degree  0:204***  0:339***  0:159***  0:251***  0:145  0:264***
(0:047) (0:087) (0:051) (0:059) (0:149) (0:065)
Fa: no degree 0:217*** 0:349*** 0:137*** 0:062  0:007 0:068
 young cohort (d) (0:031) (0:054) (0:039) (0:049) (0:139) (0:054)
Fa: primary/preparatory degree 0:045 0:176* 0:004  0:075  0:170  0:057
 young cohort (d) (0:054) (0:107) (0:058) (0:071) (0:170) (0:080)
N 4,549 2,106 2,443 4,549 2,106 2,443
R
2 0.1884 0.1661 0.1810 0.1935 0.1335 0.1981
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: OLS results are reported with standard errors controlling for clustering at the household level in paren-
theses. All specications include dummies for the son's year of birth and a constant. \Full sample" includes both
the \old" cohort (i.e. men born 1949-1960) and the \young" cohort (i.e. men born 1968-1977). \Urban areas"
and \rural areas" refer to the place of residence at birth. The reference category for father's education in the
alternative specication is \secondary degree and above".
the upper part of the table shows results for measuring father's education in terms of
years of schooling while the lower part of the table displays results for specifying father's
education as a categorical variable. Because of the small share of fathers with a post-
secondary degree, the reference category now comprises fathers with both a secondary
school degree and a post-secondary degree.20 The estimates for the son's probability of
obtaining a secondary school degree or above are in line with earlier results { namely, the
decline in the association between fathers' and sons' education is driven not only by the
fact that many men of the young cohort obtain just a few years of schooling, but also by
in (i), urban areas. Here, the probit estimates for the interaction terms with the father's educational
attainment are not statistically signicant.
20Using OLS would have allowed the renewed use of the earlier reference category. However, it would
then not be possible to compare results to probit estimates.
23the increased access to secondary and post-secondary education. Furthermore, similar
to the results for sons' years of schooling, among the old cohort, a father's education has
been more strongly correlated with the son's education in rural areas, but this association
has also declined more strongly. Specically, in rural areas the association between an
additional year of schooling for the father and the probability that the son will achieve
at least a secondary school degree has dropped by almost half for men of the young
cohort in comparison to the old cohort.
What about access to university education? Estimation results in the right part of
Table 6 suggest that post-secondary education has, contrary to the results in the rst
three columns, remained somewhat exclusive both in rural and in urban areas. While in
urban areas the estimates for the main specication indicate a signicant decline in the
relationship between fathers' years of schooling and sons' likelihood of achieving higher
education, this decline is very small. There is also no signicant change over time in the
alternative specication.21
In terms of the theoretical framework, there are two possible explanations for an
increase in educational attainment: a decrease in schooling costs { for instance, since
new schools have been built { and an increase in the net expected gain of investing in
schooling. The expansion of the educational system certainly played its role by reducing
costs, but so did the employment guarantee scheme, by raising aspirations for moving up
socially: as will be shown in the next section, nearly all (post-) secondary graduates of
the old cohort, i.e. across the social strata, obtained a professional (formal) occupation.
The dierent results for secondary and university education suggest that the costs to
university education relative to secondary school education have remained high.
6.2 Intergenerational Occupational Mobility across Cohorts
Let us rst take a look at the outow percentages for both cohorts in Table 7.22 Along
the diagonal we observe little change for the non-manual and skilled manual occupa-
tions. Immobility seems to have decreased only among farmers (from 51% to 40%) and
increased among the semi/unskilled manual laborers (from 22% to 29%). Immobility
has been and still is highest among professionals, at 56% for men of the young cohort.
Despite substantial immobility, roughly one-quarter of sons with a father in a white-
21This is in line with preliminary results from the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), which
reveals that only a small share of university students comes from the lower wealth quintiles (Population
Council, 2010).
22The corresponding mobility tables are presented in the Appendix in Table 15. They show in partic-
ular the strong decline in the share of farmers over the past century. As no ranking is assumed, overall
upward and downward mobilities have not been calculated.
24Table 7: Outow Percentages for Fathers' and Sons' Occupational Attainment.
1949-1960 Cohort (N=1,617)
Son's occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
(1) Farmers 51:48 10:94 9:30 12:16 16:13 100.00
Father's (2) Semi/unskilled manual 5:27 22:03 21:76 21:14 29:80 100.00
occupation (3) Skilled manual 4:48 17:86 41:75 12:15 23:76 100.00
(4) White collar 4:12 14:74 28:12 25:01 28:02 100.00
(5) Professional 2:17 7:95 12:89 23:09 53:90 100.00
Total 26:35 12:95 17:28 16:71 26:70 100.00
1968-1977 Cohort (N=2,320)
Son's occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
(1) Farmers 40:26 12:75 21:97 10:25 14:78 100.00
Father's (2) Semi/unskilled manual 6:46 29:35 21:08 16:94 26:17 100.00
occupation (3) Skilled manual 2:86 17:54 42:98 16:37 20:25 100.00
(4) White collar 7:52 15:88 24:11 25:35 27:15 100.00
(5) Professional 3:04 8:70 14:84 17:85 55:58 100.00
Total 17:43 15:49 23:46 16:00 27:62 100.00
Notes: Son's occupation refers to his occupation at age 28. Source: ELMPS06.
collar or manual profession had obtained a professional occupation by their late 20s, the
proportion being slightly lower for men born in 1968-1977. There is some permeability
across all occupations except for farmers: relatively few men from outside seem to enter
this occupation.
The marginal distributions indicate that the share of non-manual relative to man-
ual occupations has not changed over time; the decrease in the share of farmers has
essentially been associated with an increase in the share of other manual occupations.
In light of the fact that the share of men with a secondary school degree or higher
has increased markedly over the same period (from 39% to 63%), this is surprising. It
suggests that professional, and, more generally, non-manual occupations have become
relatively scarce, which is conrmed in Figure 2. Among men with secondary school
degrees and above, 83% (59%) of the old cohort obtained a non-manual (professional)
occupation by the age of 28 compared to 61% (41%) of the young cohort. Among men
with a university education, the decline is less drastic. Similarly, the share of formal
jobs out of all wage work decreased: among secondary graduates and higher, 57% of
the young cohort compared to 86% of the old cohort had a formal job by the age of
25Figure 2: Changes in the Availability of Jobs across Cohorts.
Notes: This gure shows, separately for the old and the young cohort, the percentage of
men with (i) secondary degrees and above and (ii) post-secondary (university) degrees, who
had obtained a non-manual occupation (professional occupation / formal job / government
sector job) by the age of 28. Source: ELMPS06.
28; among university graduates, the comparable gures are 76% and 88%. Government
sector employment has become more rare too: among university graduates, only 58% of
the young cohort worked in the government sector compared to 82% of the old cohort;
for secondary school graduates and higher the gures are 43% and 80%, respectively.
The decline in government sector employment has been more dramatic than the decline
in formal jobs which shows that the private sector is increasingly oering non-manual,
formal jobs too, especially for university graduates.
Based on the foregoing descriptive statistics, a signicant share of secondary school
graduates should hold a manual occupation. Figure 4 in the Appendix plots for each
cohort the educational distribution of workers across occupations. While the tremendous
increase in educational attainment over time has led to an overall increase in the average
amount of schooling within each occupation, we can also see a strong increase in the
share of men with a secondary degree who seem \stuck" in semi/unskilled manual work,
such as taxi drivers and security guards. In fact, secondary school graduates make up
by far the largest educational group of all semi/unskilled workers. Their share is also
26high among skilled manual employees. In contrast, relatively few university graduates
hold a manual occupation.
Overall, the descriptive statistics demonstrate that the profound changes that have
occurred in the labor market over the past decades did not \merely" aect the school-to-
work transition but had a more permanent eect on the labor market outcomes of many
youth. Given the increasing scarcity of the preferred jobs, labor market competition
among well-educated men in the young cohort has intensied. This increased competition
all the more raises questions concerning who manages to actually obtain these jobs.
The upper part of Table 8 shows regression results for equation (6), i.e. relating
the son's probability for attaining a professional occupation by the age of 28 { or, al-
ternatively, a non-manual occupation (i.e. a white collar or a professional occupation),
a formal job, or a government sector job { to whether or not his father worked as a
professional.23 As hypothesized, for the old cohort, university graduates from the lower
ranks of society were not disadvantaged. That is, once they achieved a university degree,
they faced equal opportunities for attaining a professional occupation. However, this no
longer holds true for university graduates of the young cohort: compared to university
graduates of the old cohort, having a father working as a professional increases the son's
likelihood of also becoming a professional by 19 percentage points, and it increases his
likelihood of obtaining a formal job by 25 percentage points. In absolute terms, uni-
versity graduates of the young cohort who come from a privileged background are 18
percentage points more likely to work as a professional compared to their counterparts,
and 16 percentage points more likely to obtain a formal job.
For the old cohort, the \eect" of having a father working as a professional on the
son's likelihood of obtaining a formal job is negative, albeit small. Note, however, that
formal and government sector employment are both dened for wage workers only. The
negative coecient estimate thus likely reects selection into non-wage employment,
i.e. graduates from a higher socio-economic background used to be more likely to be
self-employed or entrepreneurs than their less well-o counterparts.
Further, the results in column (4) indicate that the decline in mobility is associated
with the way jobs are allocated in the formal private, rather than in the public sector.
This is in line with the sociological literature cited earlier that has argued that graduates
from a low socio-economic background lack the right skills and/or personal connections
to obtain a professional position in the private sector. While the dataset does not
allow one to discriminate between these two sources of inequality, the dataset does
23Estimating a probit instead of a linear probability model produces very similar results (see also
section 6.3).
27Table 8: Among Sons with Post-Secondary (University) Degrees: Relationship be-
tween Father's Occupation and Son's Occupation/Job (at Age 28).
Dep. variable: son's probability to obtain a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
non-manual professional formal job gov. sector
occupation occupation job
Specication A:
Fa: professional (d) 0:029  0:002  0:087* 0:009
(0:027) (0:050) (0:050) (0:052)
Fa: professional 0:111*** 0:187*** 0:251*** 0:003
 young cohort (d) (0:038) (0:062) (0:060) (0:070)
N 1,002 1,002 870 870
R
2 0.061 0.085 0.099 0.125
Specication B:
Fa: farmer 0:062  0:042 0:053 0:063
(0:081) (0:091) (0:081) (0:110)
Fa: semi/unsk. manual 0:056  0:056 0:074 0:094
(0:080) (0:094) (0:074) (0:113)
Fa: white collar 0:052  0:142  0:055  0:010
(0:086) (0:101) (0:089) (0:120)
Fa: professional 0:082  0:076  0:072 0:048
(0:070) (0:083) (0:073) (0:109)
Fa: farmer  0:014 0:223* 0:087 0:110
 young cohort (d) (0:109) (0:122) (0:122) (0:141)
Fa: semi/unsk. manual 0:055 0:170 0:090 0:140
 young cohort (d) (0:110) (0:132) (0:120) (0:147)
Fa: white collar 0:108 0:238* 0:111 0:158
 young cohort (d) (0:112) (0:133) (0:131) (0:152)
Fa: professional 0:148 0:368*** 0:331*** 0:115
 young cohort (d) (0:094) (0:112) (0:111) (0:136)
N 1,002 1,002 870 870
R
2 0.074 0.094 0.111 0.135
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference category (specication B): \skilled manual".
Notes: OLS coecient estimates are reported with robust standard errors controlling for
clustering at the household level in parentheses. Non-manual occupations comprise white
collar and professional occupations. All specications include a dummy for belonging to the
young cohort, dummies for the son's year of birth, a dummy for being born in an urban area,
and a constant.
provide information about the main and the secondary (if there was a secondary) job
search method used to obtain the current primary job, including whether the current job
was obtained with the help of relatives or friends.24 Figure 3 shows the percentage of
24Alternative methods were: registered in government employment or private employment oce, en-
tered government job lottery competition, sent job application, inquired at the work site, advertised in
28Figure 3: University Graduates of the Young Cohort who Found their Current Job
through Relatives or Friends
Notes: This gure shows the percentage of post-secondary graduates who state as their
main or secondary job search method for their current main job that they received help
from relatives or friends, separate for (i) whether their current job is located in the public or
the private sector, (ii) unconditional or conditional on currently holding a professional occu-
pation, and (iii) whether or not their father is working as a professional. Source: ELMPS06.
university graduates of the young cohort who state that they received their current main
job through relatives or friends. The percentages are presented depending on the sector of
employment and the occupational status of the father. Note that since this information is
not available for previous employment positions, comparing job search methods across
cohorts is problematic. As regards government sector employment, gures are very
similar, however, for the old cohort; as regards private sector employment, there are
very few university graduates from the old cohort with their current primary job located
in the private sector. While there is likely selection into the sector of employment, the
share of university graduates that received help from their family or friends is markedly
high (close to 40 percent) for those who work in the private sector and succeed in
attaining a professional occupation. In contrast, the corresponding share for graduates
who take a job in the public sector is only slightly over 10 percent. This suggests that
newspapers, applied to a job advertised in newspapers, contacted employer, contacted contractor, waited
at gathering locations, searched for a private project, arranged to get nancing for a private project, and
other.
29the decline in social mobility may be related, at least in part, to not having the right
personal connections to secure such an occupation.
The lower part of Table 8 demonstrates that these ndings remain robust when using
a more comprehensive occupational measure for fathers, with the exception of column
(1). However, a white-collar occupation is not perceived as an \appropriate" job for a
university graduate, and thus it may not be surprising to nd a statistically insignicant
eect in the rst column. Note that in specication B, the reference category for the
father's occupation is \skilled manual worker".
Taken together, the empirical results provide microeconomic evidence for a decline
in social mobility among university graduates. Hence, aspirations for achieving a high-
level occupation and for moving up socially have, to some extent, remained unfullled
among those from a lower socio-economic background. More specically, the results
suggest that for men from a less privileged background, the main hurdle for the old
cohort was achieving a higher education. By contrast, for the young cohort, achieving a
higher education has been only half the battle when it comes to securing a professional
or formal occupation.
6.2.1 Alternative Specications
Because the employment guarantee scheme applied not only to university graduates,
but also to secondary school graduates, equation (6) is reestimated using the subsample
of secondary and post-secondary graduates (see Table 9). Recall that, compared to
university graduates, secondary school graduates of the old cohort were less likely to
attain a professional occupation, but were almost equally likely to obtain a formal job
(compare Figure 2). It thus seems plausible that, already for the old cohort, parental
background mattered with respect to attaining a professional occupation. This was
indeed the case: having a father working as a professional was associated with an increase
in the son's likelihood of obtaining a professional occupation by 0.15; this is even more
true for the young cohort (an additional increase in the likelihood by 0.13). As regards
formal employment, however, the coecient estimates are similar to those found for
university graduates, in terms of both statistical signicance and size. That is, parental
background plays a role in obtaining a formal job only for the young cohort. Overall,
these results suggest that as soon as employment opportunities in the private sector
become limited, graduates from a high socio-economic background have an advantage
over those from a low socio-economic background.
An alternative way to think about the decline in social mobility among the well-
30Table 9: Among Sons with Secondary Degrees and above: Relationship between Fa-
ther's Occupation and Son's Occupation/Job (at Age 28).
Dependent variable: son's probability to obtain a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
non-manual professional formal job gov. sector
occupation occupation job
Specication A:
Fa: professional (d) 0:092*** 0:151***  0:069*  0:011
(0:033) (0:044) (0:039) (0:040)
Fa: professional 0:176*** 0:133** 0:252*** 0:067
 young cohort (d) (0:042) (0:053) (0:051) (0:054)
N 2,186 2,186 1,777 1,777
R
2 0.123 0.111 0.130 0.147
Specication B:
Fa: farmer 0:163** 0:014 0:160** 0:181**
(0:072) (0:080) (0:069) (0:078)
Fa: semi/unsk. manual 0:143* 0:044 0:126* 0:146*
(0:075) (0:087) (0:069) (0:081)
Fa: white collar 0:095  0:033 0:024 0:077
(0:079) (0:086) (0:075) (0:085)
Fa: professional 0:217*** 0:158** 0:024 0:110
(0:066) (0:076) (0:067) (0:077)
Fa: farmer  0:228***  0:012  0:117  0:135
 young cohort (d) (0:086) (0:091) (0:088) (0:093)
Fa: semi/unsk. manual  0:085 0:024  0:026  0:056
 young cohort (d) (0:091) (0:101) (0:091) (0:099)
Fa: white collar 0:019 0:074 0:027 0:011
 young cohort (d) (0:093) (0:100) (0:095) (0:101)
Fa: professional 0:072 0:151* 0:204** 0:000
 young cohort (d) (0:079) (0:089) (0:086) (0:093)
N 2,186 2,186 1,777 1,777
R
2 0.138 0.113 0.136 0.153
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference category (specication B): \skilled manual".
Notes: OLS coecient estimates are reported with robust standard errors controlling for
clustering at the household level in parentheses. All specications include a dummy for
belonging to the young cohort, dummies for the son's year of birth, a dummy for being born
in an urban area and a constant.
educated may be to hold parental background xed, and to examine whether the returns
to university education (in terms of occupational outcomes) have changed over time (see
equation (7)). Estimation results in column (1) in Table 10 show that, conditional on
the fathers not working in a professional occupation, the sons' (occupational) returns to
university education have declined over time: the likelihood of obtaining a professional
occupation has declined by 15 percentage points for secondary school graduates and by
31Table 10: Changes in the Occupational Returns to Schooling over Time.
Dependent variable:
son's probability to obtain a professional occupation
(1) (2) (3)
Cond. on the father not Cond. on the father Full sample
working as professional working as professional
Primary/preparatory degree 0:014 0:000 0:011
(0:020) (0:095) (0:020)
Secondary degree 0:269*** 0:258*** 0:268***
(0:034) (0:092) (0:034)
Post-secondary degree 0:749*** 0:505*** 0:751***
(0:033) (0:073) (0:033)
Primary/preparatory degree  0:007 0:144 0:005
 young cohort (d) (0:024) (0:134) (0:024)
Secondary degree  0:148***  0:034  0:138***
 young cohort (d) (0:038) (0:114) (0:038)
Post-secondary degree  0:159*** 0:189**  0:151***
 young cohort (d) (0:043) (0:093) (0:044)
Fa: professional (d) 0:181***
(0:043)
Primary/preparatory degree 0:003
 Fa: prof (0:083)
Secondary degree 0:007
 Fa: prof (0:085)
Post-secondary degree  0:202***
 Fa: prof (0:064)
Primary/preparatory degree 0:043
 Fa: prof  young cohort (0:106)
Secondary degree  0:019
 Fa: prof  young cohort (0:086)
Post-secondary degree 0:193***
 Fa: prof  young cohort (0:061)
N 3,154 855 4,009
R
2 0.376 0.294 0.408
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference category for the son's years of schooling: \no educational degree".
Notes: OLS coecient estimates are reported with robust standard errors controlling for clustering
at the household level in parentheses. All specications include a dummy for belonging to the
young cohort, dummies for the son's year of birth, a dummy for being born in an urban area and
a constant.
16 percentage points for university graduates. In contrast, results in column (2) indicate
that for their better-o counterparts, the returns to education actually increased. The
fact that the returns to university education used to be comparatively high for those
from a low socio-economic background illustrates that, essentially, without a university
degree, these men had a negligible chance of attaining a professional occupation { in
32contrast to their better-o counterparts. Finally, column (3) conrms that for those
who come from a lower socio-economic background the returns to university education
declined relative to those who come from a high socio-economic background.
Finally, it could be that the expansion of the educational system allowed less able
children from a low socio-economic background to gain a university education and that
it is these kids who, eventually, end up in inferior occupations or jobs. Yet, the increase
in private costs to public education, especially increasing expenses for private tutoring,
together with the earlier nding that university education has remained exclusive, speak
against such a scenario. If there is an ability discrepancy at all, it is more likely that
university graduates from a low socio-economic background are, on average, \smarter"
than their better-o counterparts.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the robustness of the estimates presented here for intergenerational edu-
cational and occupational mobility, the models for sons' years of schooling and sons'
likelihood of attaining a professional occupation are reestimated, changing the cohort
parameters of the old cohort to men born between 1951 and 1960 and to men born be-
tween 1949 and 1958. For the young cohort, the alternative cohort parameters are men
born between 1970 and 1977 and men born between 1968 and 1975. Additionally, sons'
current place of residence is used instead of residence at birth. The estimation results
for intergenerational educational mobility are displayed in Table 16 in the Appendix and
should be compared to the last three columns in Table 5. Overall, these results support
the previous ones. As we would expect, the association between fathers' and sons' years
of schooling is slightly stronger when the old cohort does not include men born in 1959
and 1960. Similarly, the reduction in the association between fathers' and sons' years of
schooling is smaller if the young cohort does not include men born in 1976 and 1977. As
for the alternative specication, restricting the old cohort to men born between 1949 and
1958 increases the association between the father having a post-secondary degree and
the son's years of schooling, resulting in a signicant decline in this association for the
young cohort. Furthermore, at the lower tail of the distribution of fathers' educational
attainment, the association between fathers' education and sons' education is stronger
for men of the old cohort. Therefore, the models for the likelihood of the son obtaining
a secondary school degree or better and of the son obtaining a post-secondary degree
are reestimated (not reported here), but results are not qualitatively dierent.
With regard to the intergenerational occupational mobility estimates, alternative
33specications additionally include comparing occupations of the sons at age 30 (instead
of 28) and using the sons' current or rst occupation in the case of an incomplete job
history. OLS results are presented in Appendix Table 17 for the subsample of sons
who achieved a post-secondary degree. Note that for clarity of exposition, results are
shown only for sons attaining a professional occupation. Hence, these estimates are to
be compared to the estimates shown in column (2) in Table 9. The results show that
across all specications, the father's occupation had essentially no \eect" on the son
attaining a professional occupation for the old cohort, but it did have an eect for the
young cohort. In some specications, graduates of the young cohort whose fathers have a
white-collar occupation are also more likely to hold a professional occupation than their
older counterparts, i.e. not only those whose fathers have a professional occupation.
Finally, it could be that among men of the young cohort, those from the lower ranks of
society eventually do attain a high-level occupation, but that they require more time.
In such a scenario, we should nd that the association between the father and the
son holding a professional occupation is lower when comparing the sons' occupational
attainment at age 30. While this is indeed the case, the coecient estimate is only
slightly smaller (.334 compared to .368).
For further comparison, Table 18 in the Appendix shows the average marginal eects
from estimating the equation (6) as a probit model. Overall, results are very similar to
the OLS estimates. Additionally, average marginal eects for how fathers' and sons'
occupations are related to each other for the full sample of sons, i.e. unconditional on
father's educational attainment, are presented in Table 19. The upper and middle parts
of the table show results for estimating the model separately for the old and the young
cohort, while the lower part of the table shows the average marginal eects based on
the full sample, including interaction terms. For the full sample, tests are performed to
determine whether the average marginal eects dier signicantly for men born in 1949-
1960 compared to men born in 1968-1977. While there are some dierences between
the old and the young cohorts, few are signicant. They are mostly related to the son's
likelihood of working at a semi/unskilled manual occupation. Thus, more generally,
immobility seems to have changed only marginally. Finally, Table 20 in the Appendix
indicates that a similar pattern emerges if the model is estimated separately for sons
born in rural and in urban areas.
347 Conclusions
This is the rst study to document the profound changes in intergenerational educational
and economic mobility for an Arab country in the Middle East. It provides quantita-
tive, microeconomic evidence for a decline in social mobility among the increasing ranks
of well-educated youth in Egypt, which has created unfullled aspirations among those
who come from the lower socio-economic strata. The fact that barriers to a university
education have remained high across the two cohorts is to some degree contrary to the
picture presented in the literature on the Islamic revival { namely, that access to a univer-
sity education has increased. However, these barriers are also likely to have aggravated
frustrations among university students from a lower socio-economic background.
It is important to note that the decline in job opportunities in the formal sector as
well as the decline in real wages in the government sector has had other far-reaching social
implications. Among other things, Egypt, and the Middle East more generally, has seen a
strong delay in men's age at rst marriage, despite the fact that pre-marital relationships
have largely remained taboo. Men typically work for years in order to aord the costs
associated with marriage, which not only include the costs for the wedding celebration
but also for housing and electrical appliances (Singerman, 1995; Hoodfar, 1997; Assaad,
Binzel and Gadallah, 2010). In addition to suciently high earnings, the bride's parents
expect the groom to hold a \respectable" job. In part, this is linked to social status, but
also, having a stable, formal job simply assures the bride's family that the groom is able
to guarantee a certain standard of living in the future and that he is able to support a
family.25 Consequently, despite the great value that family formation continues to play
in the Middle East, only about 53% of men aged 25-29 are married { the lowest gure
compared to other developing regions (Mensch and Casterline, 2005).
Two sources of low social mobility in Egypt have been proposed in the literature re-
viewed earlier: personal connections and the nancial resources necessary for acquiring
the additional skills oered by the private education sector. The latter factor emphasizes
the importance of public-school quality in providing equal opportunities when capital
markets are imperfect, while personal connections are linked to the functioning of the
labor market. The empirical analysis presented here provides some evidence for personal
connections playing a signicant role in the private sector. If personal or social connec-
25Women's increased educational attainment has put further pressure on the groom's side as the
following quote from a university graduate illustrates: \I'm trying to get both, status and money; when
you want to marry, you need both. If you tell the family of a girl you're interested in marrying that
you have a government job, but you're only earning 70 pounds a month, they tell you to nish your tea
and go home. And if you're just a plain taxi driver and the girl is educated, they also might not agree"
(Wickham, 2002, p. 58).
35tions are based on kinship ties, they likely reinforce high economic persistence across
generations. The empirical results further indicate that it is only when employment
opportunities in the private sector become scarce that a graduate's parental background
begins to play a role. Hence, in regard to Egypt { and presumably Middle Eastern
countries more generally { the importance of personal connections seems to have been
exacerbated by the fact that the dominance of the public sector and the high degree of
regulation in the private sector have constrained the labor market's ability to absorb
newly-skilled labor market entrants. Hence, contrary to empirical evidence for Latin
America (Behrman, Gaviria and Sz ekely, 2001; Dunn, 2007; Hertz et al., 2007), the
overall high transmission of economic status across generations in Egypt seems not to
be primarily driven by capital market imperfections, but by labor market ineciencies.
Therefore, aside from school quality, this paper has stressed the need to address labor
market issues.
Education and labor market policies in the Arab world have had a devastating impact
on many young people and have contributed to religious and political tensions throughout
the region. The Middle East is a test case in how dangerous it can be to create aspirations
among the young and their families by providing increased access to education without
undertaking corresponding measures to strengthen the labor market.
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41A Construction of Occupational Categories
The ve occupational categories { professionals (i.e. higher and lower service work-
ers), other white-collar (i.e. routine non-manual) workers, skilled manual laborers,
semi/unskilled manual laborers and farmers { were constructed as follows.26 First,
based on the codebook of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
(CAPMAS), Egypt's National Statistical Bureau, the CAPMAS occupational codes were
mapped to the ILO International Standard Classication of Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88;
ILO, 1991) codes at the 3-digit level, the highest digit level available in the codebook.
The major dierence between the CAPMAS and the ISCO-88 occupational scheme is
that CAPMAS adapted the ILO scheme to include further sub-categories { for instance,
whether the individual is working in the private or public sector. The ISCO-88 codes
were then mapped to the \root" EGP classes based on the technique provided in Ganze-
boom and Treiman (1996).27 In order to consider exceptions in the mapping scheme
at the 4-digit level, occupational categories were traced in the CAPMAS codebook and
assigned to the appropriate root EGP classes. Finally, the root EGP classes were col-
lapsed to the ve categories mentioned above; see Table 11. Given the high share of
men working in agriculture in Egypt, farmers are kept in a category separate from other
manual labor. Finally, note that large enterprise department managers in the eld of
agriculture are coded as professionals, not as farmers.
Table 12 shows how the dierent occupations are related to various job characteristics
based on the current primary employment of men aged 20 to 65 in the 2006 cross section
of the ELMPS06. In contrast to all other occupations, a relatively small share of farmers
works for a wage. As expected, unpaid family work is much higher among farmers.
Similarly, the share of employers varies strongly across occupations. Note that the
sector of employment and the formality of the job refer to wage and salary workers only.
In particular, professional occupations are associated with working in the government
sector and with having a formal job, i.e. a job providing both social insurance and a
work contract. For wage earners, average monthly earnings, including bonuses and other
supplementary payments for regular workers, are displayed in Table 13.28
26The construction of occupational categories was part of a joint research project with Marwan
Khawaja.
27In contrast to the root EGP classes, the enhanced EGP scheme uses information about self-
employment and supervisory status in order to further dierentiate between occupations.
28Since consumer price indices were not available for urban and rural areas, for comparability the
sample is split up based on men's current area of residence. Using the exchange rate as of January 2006,
1 US dollar is equivalent to 5.7 Egyptian pounds.
42Table 11: Occupational Categories and Overall Distribution.
Occupation Overall Most numerous ISCO-88 titles
share
Professional 27:10 [Large Enterprise] Department Managers; Primary and Pre-Primary
Education Teaching Professionals; Physical and Engineering
Science Technicians
White collar 15:74 Housekeeping and Restaurant Services Workers; Shop Salespersons
and Demonstrators
Skilled manual 20:72 Building Frame, etc. Trades Workers; Building Finishers, etc.
Trades Workers; Wood Treaters, Cabinet-Makers, etc. Trades Workers
Semi/Unskilled 15:55 Motor-Vehicle Drivers; Protective Service Workers; Domestic, etc.
manual Helpers; Cleaners and Launderers
Farmers 20:88
Total 100:00
Notes: Based on men aged 20-65 (N=8,193). Source: ELMPS06.
Table 12: Employment Status, Sector of Employment and Job Formality by Occupa-
tion.
Employment Status (N=8,193) Share of public Share of
Waged Employer Self- Unpaid sector jobs formal jobs
employed family work (N=4,196) (N=5,540)
Professional 71:96 16:97 10:67 0:41 76:02 88:84
White collar 82:18 2:92 10:98 3:92 56:30 64:00
Skilled manual 74:71 11:61 11:53 2:14 22:70 20:86
Semi/Unskilled manual 88:27 3:35 7:69 0:69 49:63 41:06
Farmers 28:69 44:34 6:88 20:09 37:48 5:18
Total 67:64 17:24 9:64 5:47 56:21 51:42
Notes: Questions about the sector of employment and job formality were administered to wage workers
only. A job is dened as \formal" if the worker has both a work contract and social insurance. Based on
men aged 20-65 (ELMPS06).
43Table 13: Average Monthly Earnings and Hourly Wage (in L.E., Egyptian Pound)
by Occupation.
Occupation Average Std. Dev. N Hourly Std. Dev. N
monthly earnings* wage
Rural Areas
Professional 669:27 1;307:34 574 4.04 8:16 571
White collar 547:68 1;849:91 528 3.08 11:13 524
Skilled manual 445:24 280:25 661 2.51 2:17 640
Semi/Unskilled manual 557:32 1;250:15 655 2.53 5:57 647
Farmers 294:91 114:18 442 1.82 0:89 437
Total 511:55 1;168:45 2,860 2.82 6:73 2,818
Urban Areas
Professional 1;116:28 1;921:00 1,017 6.11 10:31 1,010
White collar 623:63 908:22 531 3.11 4:50 524
Skilled manual 623:57 924:92 601 3.26 5:25 590
Semi/Unskilled manual 562:17 676:13 469 2.58 2:89 464
Farmers 453:51 417:28 41 2.65 2:35 40
Total 798:62 1;383:79 2,659 4.20 7:41 2,629
*For wage workers with a regular income (permanent or temporary) bonus and other supplementary
payments are included. For wage workers with an irregular income it refers to monetary income and
income in kind. Using the exchange rate of January 2006, 1 US dollar is equivalent to 5.7 Egyptian
pounds (L.E.).
Notes: Based on men aged 20-65 living in rural/urban areas (ELMPS06).
44B Mobility Tables
Table 14: Mobility Tables for Fathers' and Sons' Educational Attainment.
1949-1960 Cohort (N=1,858)
Son's education
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
(1) No degree 42:78 15:29 15:13 10:29 83:49
Father's (2) Primary/preparatory degree 1:10 1:17 2:29 4:05 8:61
education (3) Secondary degree 0:20 0:27 1:21 2:48 4:17
(4) Above secondary degree 0:00 0:06 0:46 3:23 3:74
Total 44:07 16:79 19:09 20:05 100:00
1968-1977 Cohort (N=2,631)
Son's education
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
(1) No degree 19:42 14:67 27:11 13:87 75:07
Father's (2) Primary/preparatory degree 0:68 1:52 4:61 4:40 11:22
education (3) Secondary degree 0:06 0:33 2:69 3:88 6:96
(4) Above secondary degree 0:03 0:10 0:68 5:94 6:75
Total 20:20 16:62 35:09 28:10 100:00
Source: ELMPS06.
Table 15: Mobility Tables for Fathers' and Sons' Occupational Attainment.
1949-1960 Cohort (N=1,617)
Son's occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
(1) Farmer 24:35 5:18 4:40 5:75 7:63 47:31
Father's (2) Semi/Unskilled manual 0:62 2:59 2:56 2:49 3:51 11:77
occupation (3) Skilled manual 0:49 1:97 4:61 1:34 2:62 11:04
(4) White collar 0:50 1:80 3:44 3:06 3:43 12:23
(5) Professional 0:38 1:40 2:28 4:07 9:51 17:65
Total 26:35 12:95 17:28 16:71 26:70 100:00
1968-1977 Cohort (N=2,320)
Son's occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
(1) Farmer 14:28 4:52 7:79 3:63 5:24 35:46
Father's (2) Semi/Unskilled manual 0:96 4:35 3:13 2:51 3:88 14:83
occupation (3) Skilled manual 0:38 2:31 5:67 2:16 2:67 13:20
(4) White collar 1:18 2:50 3:79 3:98 4:27 15:72
(5) Professional 0:63 1:81 3:08 3:71 11:56 20:79
Total 17:43 15:49 23:46 16:00 27:62 100:00
Source: ELMPS06.




Figure 4: Distribution of Educational Attainment across Occupations.
46D Results from the Sensitivity Analysis (Section 6.3)
Table 16: Robustness Analysis for Intergenerational Educational Mobility Estimates.
Years of schooling
Old cohort Young cohort Current place of residence
1951-60 1949-58 1970-77 1968-75 Rural Urban
Fa: years of schooling 0:659*** 0:735*** 0:698*** 0:698*** 0:840*** 0:533***
(0:030) (0:029) (0:027) (0:027) (0:074) (0:029)
Fa: years of schooling  0:219***  0:295***  0:263***  0:247***  0:344***  0:184***
 young cohort (d) (0:033) (0:033) (0:031) (0:032) (0:081) (0:034)
N 4,261 4,207 4,145 3,902 1,979 2,570
R
2 0.2118 0.2447 0.2427 0.2254 0.2095 0.2218
Alternative specication:
Fa: no degree  7:370***  8:017***  7:879***  7:879***  9:459***  5:876***
(0:556) (0:548) (0:492) (0:492) (0:926) (0:556)
Fa: primary/preparatory degree  1:598**  1:197  1:684**  1:684**  2:699**  1:230
(0:746) (0:766) (0:689) (0:689) (1:303) (0:778)
Fa: post-secondary degree 2:264*** 2:769*** 2:249*** 2:249*** 1:309 2:364***
(0:634) (0:610) (0:566) (0:566) (1:832) (0:591)
Fa: no degree 2:146*** 2:793*** 2:683*** 2:592*** 3:357*** 1:954***
 young cohort (d) (0:617) (0:609) (0:570) (0:581) (1:075) (0:636)
Fa: primary/preparatory degree  0:238  0:639  0:159 0:128  0:128  0:169
 young cohort (d) (0:821) (0:840) (0:779) (0:798) (1:503) (0:857)
Fa: post-secondary degree  0:673  1:178*  0:727  0:700 0:180  0:634
 young cohort (d) (0:692) (0:670) (0:634) (0:659) (1:942) (0:663)
N 4,261 4,207 4,145 3,902 1,979 2,570
R
2 0.2129 0.2465 0.2447 0.2280 0.2081 0.2240
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: OLS results are reported with standard errors controlling for clustering at the household level in
parentheses. All specications include dummies for the son's year of birth and a constant. The reference


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 18: Among Sons with Secondary Degrees and above: Relationship between
Father's Occupation and Son's Occupation/Job (at Age 28).
Dep. variable: son's probability to obtain a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
non-manual professional formal job gov. sector
occupation occupation job
(i) Sample of sons with post-secondary degrees
Fa (old cohort): farmer 0:132  0:029 0:033 0:118
(0:112) (0:101) (0:073) (0:087)
Fa (old cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:120  0:050 0:061 0:090
(0:108) (0:106) (0:076) (0:086)
Fa (old cohort): white collar 0:112  0:172  0:073 0:003
(0:121) (0:116) (0:093) (0:091)
Fa (old cohort): professional 0:165  0:074  0:078 0:046
(0:113) (0:096) (0:078) (0:081)
Fa (young cohort): farmer 0:052 0:173** 0:119 0:215**
(0:067) (0:079) (0:087) (0:087)
Fa (young cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:107 0:112 0:162** 0:220**
(0:068) (0:084) (0:088) (0:091)
Fa (young cohort): white collar 0:145** 0:092 0:058 0:123
(0:067) (0:080) (0:089) (0:087)
Fa (young cohort): professional 0:207*** 0:273*** 0:254*** 0:133*
(0:064) (0:072) (0:082) (0:077)
N 1,002 1,002 870 870
pseudo R
2 0.0935 0.0884 0.1204 0.1056
(ii) Sample of sons with secondary degrees and above
Fa (old cohort): farmer 0:135*  0:024 0:117 0:193**
(0:078) (0:078) (0:080) (0:080)
Fa (old cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:147* 0:035 0:122 0:146*
(0:082) (0:086) (0:084) (0:082)
Fa (old cohort): white collar 0:102  0:037 0:016 0:078
(0:084) (0:085) (0:087) (0:083)
Fa (old cohort): professional 0:238*** 0:159** 0:026 0:110
(0:083) (0:076) (0:078) (0:077)
Fa (young cohort): farmer  0:103**  0:034  0:012 0:062
(0:048) (0:045) (0:055) (0:053)
Fa (young cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:051 0:059 0:086 0:090
(0:052) (0:051) (0:058) (0:056)
Fa (young cohort): white collar 0:106** 0:032 0:045 0:087
(0:050) (0:049) (0:056) (0:054)
Fa (young cohort): professional 0:284*** 0:308*** 0:223*** 0:106**
(0:046) (0:045) (0:052) (0:051)
N 2,186 2,186 1,777 1,777
pseudo R
2 0.1106 0.0830 0.1100 0.1216
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference category for father's occupational attainment: \skilled manual".
Notes: Average marginal eects are reported taking into account the categorical nature of father's occupation
and, where needed, the interaction terms with the dummy for belonging to the young cohort. Standard errors
controlling for clustering at the household level are reported in parentheses. All specications include a dummy
for belonging to the young cohort, dummies for the son's year of birth and a constant.
49Table 19: Multinomial Logit Results for Son's Occupational Attainment (at Age 28).
Dependent variable: son's occupational attainment
Farmers Semi/Unsk. Skilled White Professionals
manual manual collar
1949-1960 Cohort (N=1,642; pseudo R
2=0.1402)
Fa: farmer 0:465***  0:083**  0:323*** 0:003  0:063*
(0:028) (0:035) (0:040) (0:028) (0:035)
Fa: semi/unskilled manual 0:006 0:024  0:198*** 0:092** 0:077
(0:027) (0:044) (0:049) (0:040) (0:049)
Fa: white collar  0:005  0:046  0:139*** 0:132*** 0:058
(0:024) (0:042) (0:053) (0:040) (0:047)
Fa: professional  0:025  0:115***  0:287*** 0:110*** 0:316***
(0:021) (0:037) (0:044) (0:036) (0:045)
1968-1977 Cohort (N=2,379; pseudo R
2=0.1049)
Fa: farmer 0:373***  0:047*  0:207***  0:062**  0:057**
(0:022) (0:028) (0:035) (0:028) (0:029)
Fa: semi/unskilled manual 0:037* 0:113***  0:219*** 0:003 0:066*
(0:019) (0:037) (0:038) (0:033) (0:037)
Fa: white collar 0:046***  0:020  0:185*** 0:090** 0:069**
(0:018) (0:033) (0:039) (0:035) (0:035)
Fa: professional 0:002  0:089***  0:279*** 0:015 0:350***
(0:014) (0:028) (0:035) (0:032) (0:035)
Full sample (N=4,021; pseudo R
2=0.1234)
Fa (old cohort): farmer 0:469***  0:140**  0:246***  0:008  0:076*
(0:050) (0:055) (0:048) (0:032) (0:040)
Fa (old cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:003 0:013  0:156*** 0:082** 0:058
(0:028) (0:057) (0:046) (0:041) (0:048)
Fa (old cohort): white collar  0:007  0:073  0:106** 0:133*** 0:053
(0:026) (0:057) (0:046) (0:044) (0:048)
Fa (old cohort): professional  0:028  0:175***  0:215*** 0:112*** 0:307***
(0:024) (0:057) (0:048) (0:042) (0:050)
Fa (young cohort): farmer 0:345***  0:032  0:219***  0:051*  0:043
(0:037) (0:023) (0:039) (0:027) (0:029)
Fa (young cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:037** 0:098***  0:230*** 0:014 0:082**
(0:018) (0:032) (0:040) (0:032) (0:037)
Fa (young cohort): white collar 0:043**  0:012  0:199*** 0:092*** 0:076**
(0:017) (0:026) (0:040) (0:034) (0:035)
Fa (young cohort): professional 0:003  0:066***  0:314*** 0:022 0:355***
(0:012) (0:023) (0:038) (0:031) (0:037)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference category for father's occupational attainment: \skilled manual".
Notes: Average marginal eects are reported taking into account the categorical nature of father's
occupation and, for the full sample, the interaction terms with the dummy for belonging to the young
cohort. Standard errors controlling for clustering at the household level are reported in parentheses.
All specications include a dummy for belonging to the young cohort and dummies for the son's year
of birth and a constant.
50Table 20: Multinomial Logit Results for Son's Occupational Attainment (at Age 28)
{ Rural versus Urban Areas.
Dependent variable: son's occupational attainment
Farmers Semi/Unsk. Skilled White Professionals
manual manual collar
Rural areas (N=1,856; pseudo R
2=0.1053)
Fa (old cohort): farmers 0:406***  0:263***  0:169*** 0:027  0:001
(0:077) (0:096) (0:065) (0:045) (0:058)
Fa (old cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:003  0:191*  0:131* 0:167** 0:152*
(0:094) (0:109) (0:069) (0:080) (0:091)
Fa (old cohort): white collar  0:056  0:197*  0:085 0:239*** 0:099
(0:087) (0:111) (0:069) (0:092) (0:086)
Fa (old cohort): professional  0:149*  0:276**  0:164** 0:271*** 0:318***
(0:081) (0:113) (0:068) (0:092) (0:098)
Fa (young cohort): farmers 0:306***  0:037  0:221*** 0:015  0:063
(0:049) (0:039) (0:063) (0:029) (0:048)
Fa (young cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:069* 0:130**  0:248*** 0:063  0:014
(0:039) (0:057) (0:073) (0:042) (0:057)
Fa (young cohort): white collar 0:068** 0:007  0:211*** 0:152***  0:017
(0:035) (0:047) (0:074) (0:052) (0:055)
Fa (young cohort): professional 0:025  0:081*  0:270*** 0:047 0:279***
(0:033) (0:042) (0:076) (0:043) (0:073)
Urban areas (N=2,165; pseudo R
2=0.0959)
Fa (old cohort): farmers 0:189** 0:029  0:254*** 0:046  0:011
(0:079) (0:067) (0:062) (0:050) (0:062)
Fa (old cohort): semi/unsk. manual  0:002 0:100  0:171*** 0:048 0:026
(0:003) (0:061) (0:059) (0:048) (0:057)
Fa (old cohort): white collar 0:009  0:021  0:123** 0:088* 0:047
(0:009) (0:059) (0:060) (0:048) (0:056)
Fa (old cohort): professional 0:013  0:120**  0:253*** 0:057 0:303***
(0:009) (0:058) (0:063) (0:045) (0:056)
Fa (young cohort): farmers 0:332***  0:031  0:219***  0:100** 0:019
(0:082) (0:036) (0:062) (0:043) (0:051)
Fa (young cohort): semi/unsk. manual 0:001 0:071*  0:208***  0:020 0:156***
(0:012) (0:037) (0:048) (0:043) (0:047)
Fa (young cohort): white collar 0:017  0:030  0:182*** 0:049 0:146***
(0:019) (0:032) (0:048) (0:044) (0:045)
Fa (young cohort): professional  0:006  0:063**  0:314***  0:002 0:384***
(0:010) (0:029) (0:046) (0:041) (0:042)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Reference category for father's occupational attainment: \skilled manual".
Notes: Average marginal eects are reported taking into account the categorical nature of father's occupation
and the interaction terms with the dummy for belonging to the young cohort. Standard errors controlling for
clustering at the household level are reported in parentheses. All specications include a dummy for belonging
to the young cohort and dummies for the son's year of birth and a constant.
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